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TWO BASIC CLAIMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
by Robert W; Burch 
Philosophers in the English-speaking countries who are sympathetic to 
phenomenology have often eschewed bringing the analytic resources of the 
English philosophical world to bear upon the phenomenological and existen- 
tial insights of continental European philosophers. In this paper I will take the 
first step toward clarifying two of phenomenology's central and basic claims, 
by rejecting certain interpretations as infeasible. I invite other philosophers to 
take the second step, which is to find clear and well-articulated interpretations 
of the basic claims that are feasible. 
Phenomenologists of every camp hold two basic theses about their disci- 
pline. The first is that it is an absolutely presuppositionless science, and the 
second is that it provides a method for answering all possible philosophical 
questions. These are not modest claims, for together they imply that phenome- 
nology contains the totality of absolute truth. They are claims which should 
be regarded with suspicion because there are good reasons for thtnking that 
they could not possibly be true. Before going into these reasons, I want to make 
it clear that I have no intention of going into the question of what precisely 
phenomenology is. Does Husserl's anti-psychologism imply that phenome- 
nology is a sort of highfalutin logical analysis? Or  does Husserl's pro-Carte- 
sianism imply that phenomenology is a brand of introspectionistic 
intuitionism? Phenomenologists themselves feud over such matters. But since 
all phenomenologists agree on the two basic theses mentioned, it seems possi- 
ble to investigate these theses without thereby needing to enter into phenome- 
nologists' internecine quarrels. Accordingly, I shall chop at the theses 
themselves and let sectarian chips fall where they may. 
If phenomenology is an absolutely presuppositionless science, what does this 
phrase mean? One often-heard interpretation is that phenomenology bases 
everything on Cartesian-style incorrigible utterances of immediate ~ntuition, 
and such utterances are not based on any evidence other than themselves. In 
this interpretation, however, there is a mistake: to equate being self-evident 
with being presuppositionless. Even if Cartesian-style incorrigible utterances 
are w~thout  evidence other than themselves, there is much about them that can 
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sensibly be doubted. Hence, accepting them as the basis for an absolutely 
indubitable science presupposes a great deal. For example, Wittgenstein ar- 
gued about such utterances-which he called khsserungen-first, that they 
cannot constitute knowledge because they are incapable even of being true o r  
false, and secondly, that contrary to appearances, they presuppose virtually the 
whole of language. Now, whether Wittgenstein is correct is not the issue. The  
issue is that Witrgenstein certainly raised cogent and plausible objections to 
k;tsserungen being presuppositionless bases for knowledge. Therefore, to ac- 
cept them straightforwardly as presuppositionless bases for absolute knowl- 
edge is itself a philosophical move with many presuppositions-for example, 
that Wittgenstein is wrong. 
To find out, then, what can sensibly be meant by saying that phenomenology 
is an absolutely presuppositionless science, we must look more closely at the 
nature of presuppositions. The ordinary notion of "presupposition" has senses 
which do  not seem to be relevant. For example, there is a causal sense: a 
healthy body presupposes a healthy diet. And there is a speaker-oriented sense: 
in telling you to do something because it is the Christian thing to do, the 
speaker is presupposing that you are favorable to the Christian viewpoint. 
There are, however, other ordinary senses of "presupposition" which are 
more relevant to phenomenology's claims. They are senses in which one propo- 
sition logically presupposes another. For example, presuppositions of argu- 
ments are unexpressed premises that the arguments logically need in order to 
be valid. Presuppositions of statements and questions are propositions that 
must be true if the statements and questions are to have their usual force. 
"John likes horses because they are big" presupposes both that John likes 
horses and also that horses are big; if either of these is not true, then there is 
either nothing to be explained by the original statement-which is a purported 
explanation-or else there is no explanation given. The question "Have you 
stopped beating your wife?" presupposes that you have previously beaten her; 
if that is not so, then the question is a puzzling nullity. 
The main difference between these ordinary senses of "presupposition" and 
the sense that phenomenologists employ seems to be merely that the phenome- 
nologists' sense is concerned not with particular propositions, but rather with 
phenomenology as a whole: it is that which is supposed to be without presup- 
positions. We can make clearer what phenomenologists are getting at by 
comparing their science with other sciences. All other sciences take many 
things for granted; these are not questioned by the sciences, and indeed could 
not be. For example, history takes for granted that the earth has existed for 
a very long time. The question can be asked whether the earth did not begin 
five minutes ago, but historians never ask that question. Indeed, qua historians 
they could not, for the question is not a historical question. The reason it is 
not is that all historical judgments imply that the earth began more than five 
minutes ago; therefore, they cannot sensibly be used as evidence in impartially 
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answering the question. Another example: physics takes for granted that math- 
ematics applies to the real world. I t  can be asked whether this is so, and why 
mathematical deductions made on pieces of paper should be replicated in 
reality. But physicists do  not, and qua physicists cannot, ask these questions. 
For they are not physical questions. The reason, again, is that all physical 
judgments imply that mathematics does apply to the world, and therefore 
cannot be used as fair evidence in investigating whether this is so. 
When phenomenologists lay claim to a presuppositionless science, then, 
what they are getting at is that phenomenology should have no presuppositions 
of the sort that history and physics do. PhenomenoIogy should not depend on 
or in any way imply propositions that are outside the scope of its investigative 
powers. If anything is implied by phenomenology, phenomenology itself 
should be able to ascertain its truth. In  this way nothing would be taken for 
granted by the discipline, and nothing would be outside its scope. 
Let us pause at this point, however, in order to tidy up  matters. For we have 
been speaking as if presuppositions were a kind of entailment, whereas this 
is not exactly so. In many cases in which P presupposes Q, P entails Q. But 
not always, as J. L. Austin polfits out (How to D o  T/zirzgs with Words, J. 0. 
Urmson, ed. [Oxford University Press, 19651, pp. 47-52). For example, "The 
present king of France is bald" presupposes that there is a present king of 
France, but there is no entailment here because the law of transposition (If A 
entails B, then not-B entails not-A) does nor work here: it IS false that if there 
is not a present king of France, then the present king of France is not bald. 
Nevertheless, the statement " 'The present king of France is bald' is true" does, 
it seems, entail that there is a present king of France. At least the law of 
transposition does hold in this case. It seems that something similar works in 
all cases of logical presupposition. If P presupposes Q, then there always seems 
to be some proposit~on of the form " 'P' is V" which does entaiI Q, and in 
which V is some validity-notion, like "true," "vaIid," "meaningful," "in pos- 
session of its standard illocutionary force," etc. 
It is not true, however, that if we have a proposition of the form " 'P' is V" 
whlch entails Q, then P presupposes Q. " 'P' is true" entails P, and yet P does 
not presuppose itself. It seems reasonable to hold, therefore, that the presuppo- 
sitions of a given propos~tion P are propositions Q that are entailed by " 'P' 
is V" and that also satisfy certain other conditions C, among which 1s the 
condition of non-identity with P. I t  follows from this point that a claim that 
a given proposition P has no presuppositions 1s a claim either that no proposi- 
tion of the form " 'P' is V" has any entailments, or  else that any proposition 
Q entailed by any proposition of the form " 'P' is V" lacks the further charac- 
teristics C that would make it into a presupposition of P. The first alternative 
is absurd, so we must adhere to the second. 
It would be reasonable, then, to t h ~ n k  that a claim that some P is presupposi- 
tionless is a claim that entailments o f "  'P' is V" lack the characteristics C that 
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would make them presuppositions of P. But, when phenomenolog~sts claim 
that phenomenology is presuppositionless, they do  not seem to have quite this 
sort of point in mind. What they seem to be attempting to say, rather, is that 
there is nothing on which phenomenology's validity, truth, meaningfulness, 
etc., depends that phenomenology does not fully take account of. The point, 
then, seems to be that anything one might want to  call a presupposition of 
phenomenology is not outside phenomenology's scope; rather, it is establisha- 
ble by phenomenology itself. T o  use now the terms employed above: phenome- 
nology seems to be holding that if Q is any proposition entailed by any claim 
of the form " 'P' is V"-where P now represents all or part of phenomenology 
and V represents any validity-word-then Q is within phenomenology's scope 
and indeed is establishable by phenomenology itself. It is not that Q fails to  
possess the characteristics C, but rather that, whether it does or not, it falls 
within the scope of phenomenoIogy. 
Having thus clarified what it means for phenomenology to be presupposi- 
tionless, we are now in a position to see the trouble spots in the basic thesis 
that it actually is presuppositionle~s. For this thesis carries a certain implica- 
tion that seems to be absurd. The implication is that any conceivable doubt 
about phenomenology's validity, truth, meaningfulness, etc., is aIready an- 
swered by phenomenology itself. Why does the thesis imply this? Because, 
after all, a doubt about phenomenology's validity, truth, meaningfulness, etc., 
is simply a question with a possibIe answer A which entails that phenome- 
nology is not valid, true, meaningful, etc. Hence, applying the law of transposi- 
tion, if phenomenology is valid, true, meaningful, etc,, then not-A is entailed. 
But now the thesis that phenomenology is presuppositionless means that in this 
situation not-A is within phenomenology's scope and indeed is establishable 
by phenomenology. In other words, A is refutable by phenomenology, Hence, 
any conceivable doubt about phenomenology is answerable by phenomenology 
itself-to phenomenology's own advantage, of course. 
This implication of the thesis that phenomenology is presuppositionless 
might seem at first to give comfort to phenomenologists, but really it should 
embarrass them. For it is inconceivable that any science should be able t o  
answer all possible questions about its own validity. Doubts about a science 
X as a whole encompass any X-ist answers to them. Moreover, with regard 
to any science it seems possible to raise questions about its validity as a whole, 
and phenomenology is no exception. Hence, phenomenological answers to 
questions about the validity of phenomenology as a whole are no real answers 
at all. In a sense phenomenology can phenomenologically guarantee itself 
against all doubt, just as in a sense a liar can guarantee that he is not lying; 
but the value of the guarantee is no better in the one case than in the other. 
The fundamentalrst argument, "God exists because the Bible says so, and what 
the Bible says is true because it is the Word of God," is equally self-guarantee- 
ing, but it should convert no one to Christianity. Phenomenology can purport 
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in the same way to insulate itself from all possible doubt, but purporting is a s  
far as it, or any other science, can get. I t  needs to be remarked here that it is 
no answer to the difficulty being raised to insist that phenomenology beglns 
with self-evident, incorrigible propositions. For we can ask what makes them 
self-evident and incorrigible, and whether there can really be propositions of 
this sort. Answers to questions like these cannot be based on the very kind of 
proposition they bring under suspicion. 
Phenomenology also claims that it is a method for finding the totality of 
philosophical truth in any subject, a method for answering all possible philo- 
sophical questions. I want to argue that there can be no such method in 
philosophy. When I say that philosophy can have no such method, I am not 
saying that there can be no way to do  philosophy or that there can be no 
systematic way to go about it. After all, not every way of doing something- 
even if it is systematic-is a method. Nor do I want to deny that there are 
styles, trends, and traditions in philosophy, or that these may involve the 
application of certain methods. Certainly phenomenology is one style of doing 
philosophy, a style rather sharply marked out by its grammar and vocabulary, 
and possibly also by its procedures in tackling problems. But I conceive of a 
method as something akin to an algorithm or decision-procedure. If one has 
a method in this sense, then one has a set of rather easy-to-follow steps which, 
if they are correctly executed, inexorably lead to the result which the method 
aims at. In applying a method, there is no room for novel moves, for creative 
inventions, for intuitive leaps. One simply ticks off the steps in the order 
specified by the method until the desired result is reached. 
Is this conception of a method a reasonable approximation to the way 
phenomenology conceives of itself as a method? Probably so. Phenomenolo- 
gists regularly say that phenomenology is objective and invariant from person 
to person. They maintain that if two persons, no  matter how different, cor- 
rectly apply phenomenology to any problem, both will come up with the same 
answer. Only a method which is algorithmic could guarantee that any two 
persons applying it to any philosophical problem concerning any subject mat- 
ter would always arrive at exactly the same answer. 
A method of this algorithmic sort for solving all possible philosophical 
problems does not itself seem to be possible. One reason for this was foreshad- 
owed in the discussion of the presuppositionlessness of phenomenology. That 
is, no science can be totally self-guaranteeing. T o  put this point in an idiom 
appropriate to methods rather than to propositions or doctrines: no method 
can establish its own applicability or correctness. The tests of any method must 
not depend solely on the method itself, for the tests would be viciously circular 
if they did. Methods are only as good as the results they yield and must be 
tested by these results. The correctness of the results, however, must then be 
tested by other criteria than whether they were reached by correctly applying 
the method. So, given any method, there is always at least one philosophical 
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problem that it cannot solve, namely the problem of the correctness of its own 
results. If phenomenology is a method, it must be tested and justrfied by 
procedures independent of it. The tests and justifications cannot, then, be solely 
further applications of phenomenology. 
There are two other, 2losely related, difficulties with the claim that there are 
methods for solving all possible philosophical problems. They are difficulties 
originally raised, I think, by Hegel. First, many of philosophy's problems are 
created by the historical process. Secondly, many of philosophy's problems 
come from domains outside of philosophy proper. Many philosophical prob- 
lems are full-blown intellectual torments before philosophy ever gets its hands 
on them. As Hegel puts it in a famous passage in the "Preface" to the Philoso- 
phy of Right: "When philosophy paints its gray in gray, a form of life has 
grown old. . . . The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of 
dusk." Since this is so, philosophy must to a large extent wait on history and 
depend on other disciplines for its very grist. Philosophy cannot, then, at any 
given time in history even anticipate all possible philosophical problems, much 
less actually solve them, and no method can help philosophy to do  this, even 
implicitly. 
Let us look at two examples of how philosophy's problems can arise out of 
the historical process. It was history alone that gave rise to the vast power of 
the medieval Catholic Church and to  the fact that it embraced many of the 
doctrines it did-for example, the Trinity and the Eucharistic miracle of the 
mass. But think how many philosophical problems owe their existence to this 
source. How very many arguments about causation, personhood, modality, 
identity, responsibility, and freedom, to name a few subjects, arose not out of 
philosophy's purest rays serene, but rather out of the messy turmoil of faith 
trying to formulate, clarify, systematize, and render consistent the obscure 
beliefs, tendencies, feelings, and urges that history thrust upon it. Another 
example: The revival in Europe of mathematical interest was historically, not 
philosophically, determined. But think how much of the peculiar logical struc- 
ture of the Cartesian system depends on this revival. The admiration of deduc- 
tion from ultimate, unquestioned geometrical axioms is surely the major cause 
of Descartes's desire to deduce all judgments from indubitable immediate 
deliverances of intellectual intuition. I t  is vain and idle to think that, armed 
with no matter what method, a Plato or an Aristotle could have deduced the 
medieval synthesis of Aquinas or the precise epistemology of Descartes. There 
are parallels, analogies, similarities, anticipations, even a few identities: but 
between the philosophical world of the classical Greeks and those of Aquinas 
and Descartes there remain wide gulfs, unbridgeable by pure intellectual reach 
and abstract methodology. They are gulfs created by the vicissitudes of history. 
Now let us look at some examples of how philosophy's problems can arise 
outside of philosophy proper. (Of course, the two previous examples also 
illustrate this.) Typically, the construction of any theory leads to new, previ- 
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ously unforeseeable, phiIosophica1 problems. Newtonian theory leads to the 
spiritual emergency crystallized in the philosophical problem of Laplace's 
demon. Einsteinian theory leads to the philosophical problems of interpreting 
curved space, simultaneity, backward-running time, and time-travel. Freudian 
theory leads to the problems of unconscious mental activities and states. Karen 
Horney's theory of neurosis leads to the philosophical problem of the moral 
dimensions of mental health. Once more, it would be absurd to suppose that 
a PIato or an Aristotle, no matter what methods he possessed, could even have 
discerned the precise character of these problems, much less have solved them. 
For the theories that give rise to them, and all similar theories, are not logical 
deductions from obvious empirical facts: they are creative inventions of in- 
novative genius. The data to which such theories respond are not, for the most 
part, facts with which ordinary men have long been familiar. They are data 
ascertainable only by special, sophisticated apparatus, or in special laboratory 
or therapeutic situations. Plato could not have observed a Doppler shift, nor 
Aristotle a transference neurosis. 
To these latter two objections someone might reply that if phenomenology 
were a method that could predict all of history down to the last detail, and 
that could deduce the entire contents of all possible theories, then the objec- 
tions would have no force. Indeed, this is correct. But would phenomenology 
want to commit itself to the belief that it can foresee the totality of history and 
discern the entire contents of all possible theories? This is very much to be 
doubted. And if we found some enthusiastic individual claiming that phenome- 
nology had given him such amazing powers, I daresay we would not take him 
very seriously. 
Now that two difficulties with phenomenology have been raised, it is time 
to observe, I hope with proper philosophical modesty, that they are no more 
than difficulties. In response to what has been argued, one might reply in a 
number of ways. Perhaps the notions of "presupposition" and "method" have 
been misconstrued. Perhaps no questions about the validity of phenomenology 
as a whole can really be raised, or perhaps any such questions presuppose the 
correctness of phenomenology. Perhaps specifically philosophical problems 
cannot have the origins suggested here. May phenomenologists, then, be urged 
by my arguments to clarify, to defend, and even to  amplify their science. All 
philosophers should profit from their efforts. 
